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1 Introduction
The question I am concerned with here is, roughly, whether there are universal fictions,
i.e. fictions within which everything is true. This is important because logical fictions -or
logical fantasies, in the terminology of Fine (1982), i.e. fictions where some features of
what one takes as the standard logic fail – sometimes are used as (admittedly defeasible)
tools to present, study, or even argue for or against, a logic; Priest (1999) and Kapsner’s
(unpublished) fictionalization of an idea of Dummett (1959) could be examples of this.1
The idea that everything is true, usually known as trivialism in the philosophy of logic,
is widely agreed to be wrong, if not unintelligible at all.2 So, as with other logical ideas,
fiction can provide a less passionate arena to explore trivialism. Additionally, universal
fictions could stimulate some reflections, not only about logic, but about the nature of
fiction itself; for example, on the narratological aspects of fiction or the identity criteria
for fictions, as has been stressed by Wildman and Folde (2017).
The problem is that even if it is more or less clear that there are actual incomplete and
inconsistent fictions, it is doubtful that a universal fiction, one where everything is true,
is even possible. Routley (1979), Deutsch (1985) and Kapsner (unpublished), although
1The term ‘logical fiction’ has been used in another sense, namely to denote an item logically constructed
out from other items. I hope it is sufficiently clear that I am dealing here with other kind of fictions, “artistic”
ones, so to speak.
2For a compendium of the (mostly) negative views on trivialism, see Priest (1998). For more calm
engagements with trivialism see Priest (1999) and Mortensen (2005).
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with different purposes, have independently advocated the existence of universal fictions.3
Actually, and this is something that would please Pierre Menard, Routley and Kapsner
have arrived at exactly the same fiction: ‘Everything is true.’ Deutsch is slightly more
imaginative and proposes ‘This is a story: Every proposition is true. The End.’ Roughly,
their recipe is crafting a fiction that includes deliberately and explicitly the proposition
Everything is true. I will use ‘fRDK ’ to designate a universal fiction along the lines of
Routley, Deutsch and Kapsner.
The possibility, let alone existence, of universal fictions have been doubted. Thus, Fine
(1982: 121) has argued that fictions cannot pick out collections of propositions that are
more than set-sized. As the collection of propositions that are true in a universal fiction will
certainly be more than set-sized, Fine’s arguments could be used to deny the existence of
such fictions. The particular Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner way of generating universal fictions
can also be discarded using other Finean arguments, as has been done by Wildman and
Folde (2017): ‘Everything’ as it occurs in a fiction may not generate enough instances to
produce effectively all propositions and make the fiction truly universal. The theses I will
defend here are that there are universal fictions and that the Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner
way of generating them is still the best one, for the main alternative, that of Wildman and
Folde, has some shortcomings. First, it falls prey to the same objection they raise against
the Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner recipe. Although I do not think it is a sound objection, this
would level the field between both proposals. Second, the logical machinery they invoke is
heavier, and actually presupposes the logical machinery of the Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner
stories. Third, such a complexity of the logical machinery together with the more narrative
nature of Wildman and Folde’s fictions invites more imaginative resistance, which would
make at least doubtful their universality.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I present some terminology on fictional
content useful for the rest of the paper. In Section 3, I reconstruct first a general worry
about universal fictions regarding their meaninglessness, and then Wildman and Folde’s
criticisms to universal fictions a` la Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner and argue that they do not
succeed. In Section 4, I discuss the main alternative to generate universal fictions, namely
Wildman and Folde’s own strategy, and I present several objections to it aiming to show
that their universal stories do not score better than the Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner fictions,
because they require heavier logical machinery, even presupposing that of the Routley-
Deutsch-Kapsner recipe, and they invite more imaginative resistance, which means that
readers might not buy the idea that they are universal fictions. Although none of them
3Routley uses a universal fiction to show the triviality of the absolutely na¨ıve theory of fictions, according
to which fictional truth implies a sort of factual truth. Deutsch uses it to show the counterintuitiveness
of Fine’s thesis that the collection of propositions true in a story is always a set and never a proper class.
Kapsner investigates ways in which a story might induce classical logic in the reader, where a story induces
a logic L when the story’s structure strongly suggests that at least certain characteristic principles of L hold
there. A universal fiction serves him to argue that if a story makes us infer every proposition that does not
mean that the story has induced in us the principle of explosion, let alone classical logic in full.
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is knock-down in the sense that they prove the non-universality of Wildman and Folde’s
stories, the objections show that all in all the Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner is still the best
way of generating universal fictions.
Given that my main concern is defending the possibility of universal fictions and com-
paring two proposal for generating them, I will leave for further work the consequences
of the existence of particular universal fictions. As I have already mentioned, Wildman
and Folde (2017) have explored those consequences for, among other issues, the allegedly
essential incompleteness of fictions and the identity criteria for fictions. I do not foresee
any difference with their conclusions on these topics, with the only exception of the latter
but, as I have said, I will leave the details for future work. Also, even if fictions are not
restricted to literary fictions and thus the discussion of universal fictions do not pertain
exclusively to literature, for simplicity all my examples will be literary. Finally, the idea of
universal fictions where everything is true invites, at least by duality, the consideration of
empty fictions where nothing is true. Nonetheless, the examination of such fictions should
be left for a separate work, too.
2 Some terminological preliminaries
Before starting, I will introduce some of Wildman and Folde’s terminology that will prove
useful for the rest of the paper. For the most part, I simply reproduce their definitions. The
content of a fiction f , also the fictional content of f , C(f), can be thought of as a collection
of propositions whose members are the fictional truths of f , in symbols: C(f) = {A| Tf [A]},
where ‘Tf [A]’ abbreviates ‘it is true in f that A’, f is a placeholder for singular terms
denoting a particular fiction, and ‘A’ a placeholder for sentences. Fictional content can be
divided into two broad sub-types. A fiction’s primary content comprises all that is explicitly
true within the fiction; thus, it is part of the primary content of Cervantes’ Don Quixote
that Don Quixote is from La Mancha, since this is explicitly asserted in the story. On the
other hand, a fiction’s secondary content comprises content that either is or can be brought
into the fiction from the outside, so to speak, or content that non-trivially logically follows
from primary or other content. The first kind of secondary content is imported content;
the other is entailed content. For instance, it is true in Don Quixote that all human
beings are mortal, and that Spain is in Europe, though neither is part of Don Quixote’s
primary content. Similarly, one could also distinguish between primary characters, that
is, characters explicitly mentioned within the fiction, and secondary characters, characters
that either are or can be brought into the fiction from the outside, so to speak, or characters
whose existence follows logically in a non-trivial manner from primary or other characters.
So, a given fiction f ’s content C(f) is composed of f ’s primary content -those propo-
sitions that are explicitly stated as being true in f - and its secondary content -those true
propositions that are either imported into the fiction or are non-trivially entailed by the
primary/imported content. Following this distinction, the universality of a fiction can be
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 2.2
67
understood in at least two senses: in the first sense, a fiction is universal if and only if all
propositions are included in its primary content; in the second sense, a fiction is universal
if and only if all propositions are included in its content, whether primary or secondary.
It can be thought that fRDK ’s are universal in the first sense, but they are not. Universal
instantiation, or any other logical mechanism to obtain every proposition from ‘Everything
is true’, is imported content, not primary one. It is most likely that there are no universal
fictions in the first sense, but universal fictions in the second sense are still interesting
philosophically.
3 Wildman and Folde’s criticisms of fRDK’s
Before examining Wildman and Folde’s criticisms to Routley-Deutsch(-Kapsner) way of
generating universal fictions, let me mention and discard a possible reaction against the
very idea of universal fictions, regardless the way they are produced. The worry is that
universal fictions are meaningless or, rather, that the propositions in a universal fiction
become meaningless. This is usually based on the thesis that a meaningful proposition
must rule something out, as Priest (1998) has pointed out.
But the worry seems unfounded, as Priest himself has exhibited. I will just rehearse
his arguments in a more systematic, condensed way. For definiteness, suppose that the
expression ‘a meaningful proposition must rule something out’ can mean two things: a
proposition is meaningful if either there are some propositions that do not follow from it
or if it divides up situations into those where it holds and those where it fails. The claim
that a meaningful proposition must rule something out in the first sense seems untrue. The
proposition Everything is true rules out nothing. But it seems meaningful; anti-trivialists
of all sorts do not seem to be arguing against a meaningless claim. Consider its negation:
Something is not true. Anti-trivialists think it is true, and so meaningful, but then its
negation should be meaningful too. Moreover, the claim that a meaningful proposition
must rule something out in the second sense seems untrue, too. For suppose there are
necessary truths. They rule out nothing, as they are true in every situation, yet they are
not meaningless. Additionally, assuming that there are situations where a proposition fails
(i.e. it is untrue) is begging the question against the trivialist, just like assuming that the
situations where the proposition ¬A holds are exactly those where A fails begs the question
against a friend of true contradictions. Thus, loony things might happen in a universal
fiction, but this is far from showing that they are literally meaningless.
Now to Wildman and Folde (2017) objections. They argue that the Routley-Deutsch(-
Kapsner) way of generating universal fictions does not work. The argument goes roughly
as follows: for an fRDK to be genuinely a universal fiction, ‘everything’ has to include
all propositions in its domain. The problem is that there is no reason to think that the
quantifier has the requisite range. Take a parallel case: grant that everyone is dead in
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Pedro Pa´ramo (sorry for the spoiler).4 Even so, this does not entail that Trump is dead in
Pedro Pa´ramo, for the range of ‘everyone’ is restricted to those individuals who are part of
the story (which Trump is not). So, like how not every individual is part of Pedro Pa´ramo
yet ‘Everyone is dead’ remains true therein, ‘Everything is true’ may be true in fRDK
yet not every possible proposition be therein true – rather, the only propositions that are
quantified over are those already included in the story. Thus, the only way they can get
the appropriate domain is to effectively beg the question, assuming that every possible
proposition is already included in fRDK , ready to be quantified over.
Deutsch (1985: 209) replied to an ancestor of this argument due to Fine (1982: 121f).
Deutsch claims that the range of quantifiers such as ‘everyone’ and ‘every proposition’
as they occur in a fiction, is determined in part by their intended interpretations. The
intended interpretation of ‘every proposition’ or ‘anything’ (meaning every proposition),
as it occurs in fRDK ’s, could well be that it is to mean literally every proposition. He
insists that, as the author of the story, that is just what he intends the quantifier, as used
in his story, to mean.
Such a defense is closely related to Routley’s discussion and rejection of the absolutely
naive theory of fictions. On Routley’s characterization, such a naive theory implies that
whatever an author asserts, especially as regards his characters, is true without qualifi-
cation, i.e. an author can really ratify whatever they please. If an author’s say-so is a
paramount determinant of truth for his worlds, and they says that his world is the actual
one and that everything is true there, then the actual world should be trivial because, by
the author’s stipulation, everything is true, and truth comes without further qualification.
So, the kind of truth that would fall under authors’ control would be rather truth in a
fiction. Routley then says that “[the author] is an authority on the worlds of his imagi-
nation and what he ratifies goes for the worlds of his fiction.” (Routley 1979: 21) In that
sense, the author can rightly say that everything is true in a fiction they crafted. But then
Routley qualifies again the stipulative powers of authors: “To be sure there are limits on
what the author can pull off in this respect: he cannot by his sayso make the city of London
into [just] a number or even [just] a motor car: there are category and type restrictions he
cannot transgress.” (Routley 1979: 24)5 This is closely related to Fine’s idea that “conven-
tions concerning the interpretation of literature cannot alter the metaphysical facts” (Fine
1982: 122).6 But Fine, unlike Routley, would say that “no legitimate convention can force
4Wildman and Folde’s (counter)example is (based on) ‘Everyone is treacherous in Threepenny Opera’.
Nothing substantial is changed in employing my own examples; I just wanted to avoid the infamous “one-
sided diet of examples” that goes over and over texts on the same topic (sorry about that, Sherlock).
5I have added the brackets because, in admitting the possibility of a universal fiction where everything
is true, Routley must accept the possibility that London is a number and a motor car in a certain story.
What is important is that London is not just that in such a fiction, but that “there is a path linking [the
author’s] London with the historical London at some time in its history” (Routley 1979: 2), and fortunately
this would be trivially achieved in a universal fiction.
6Observations like those of Routley and Fine on the limits of authorial intention might be at the base
of the phenomenon known as imaginative resistance. Imaginative resistance is the phenomenon in which
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a story to be about a proper class of objects”, that would be one of those “category and
type restrictions” that cannot be transgressed. The important thing here is that even by
the lights of an advocate of universal fictions, such as Routley, it might well be the case
that an author’s saying that everything is true in a fiction they crafted is not enough to
make it so. As Wildman and Folde’s attempt to show with their Finean argument, the
universal quantifier in a universal fiction might fail to have the requisite range even in spite
of the authors’ intentions.7
But Wildman and Folde’s conclusion is a bit too quick, I think. First, how can ‘Everyone
is dead’ be true in Pedro Pa´ramo, as Wildman and Folde say, and not entail ‘Trump
is dead’ or even ‘Eulalio Gutie´rrez is dead’? (Eulalio Gutie´rrez would be a secondary
character; arguably the Mexican president at the time when at least part of the story
occurs.) Wildman and Folde say that this is because the range of ‘everyone’ is restricted to
those individuals who are part of the story (which Trump is not); moreover, it is restricted
to the primary characters, not the imported ones (such as Eulalio Gutie´rrez). But such a
restriction is tacit, as it is not explicit in ‘Everyone is dead’. As such, the phenomenon is
very common: there is the trite ‘Everyone is in the classroom’, which can be regarded as
true for most classrooms in the right conditions even if, say, Socrates is not there. Part of
those “right conditions” under which ‘Everyone is in the classroom’ is true is that the range
of ‘everyone’ is restricted to those included in the class list or using a similar restriction.
But there are other universal affirmations, even in the same classroom, that are not
restricted in the same way. Suppose the teacher is a militant Cartesian and says ‘Everyone
is a composite of mind and body’. Surely the range of the quantifier ‘everyone’ is not
restricted to those appearing in the class list. So, yes, quantifications usually come with
a tacit domain of quantification, but this does not imply that it needs to be restricted, it
can be truly universal. When in doubt, and when pragmatic or contextual elements do not
help to determine the scope of the quantifier, one has to rely on analysis, and check the
consequences of the purported interpretations, especially their coherence with other more
secure beliefs or assertions.
What is true in Pedro Pa´ramo seems to be rather a sentence like ’Everyone (of the
main characters) is dead’. Wildman and Folde suggest that the sentence true in a fRDK is
‘Everything (in fRDK) is true’. But such a paraphrase might fail tests like those suggested
by Priest in Sylvan’s Box: readers can answer affirmatively to questions of the form ’Is
the imagination of the spectator of a fiction revolts against an author’s saying or attempt of fictionalizing
something. For example, an author claiming, perhaps through a character, that it is true that infanticide
is morally right, or that it is true that a certain unfunny joke is funny, most likely find that the spectator
does not accept the morality of infanticide, or the fun of the unfunny joke, even within the fiction itself,
although the very same spectator can grant other say-sos of the author at least for the sake of fiction – ex.
gr. that some kids travel across galaxies by using some supra-luminal cereal box. See Gendler (2009) and
the references therein for further details.
7Further discussion about whether a fiction has a property just because its authors say so can be found
in the abundant literature on authorial intent and the so-called “intentional fallacy”. See Lyas and Stecker
(2009) and the references therein for more details.
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‘X’ true in fRDK ’s?’, for every sentence X, including sentences not appearing explicitly
in the fiction. This suggests that the sentence true in a fRDK is rather ‘Everything (in
actual English, at least) is true’, as intended by the authors. And this is not odd at all.
Suppose that the sentence ‘God created everything’ is true in the Bible. Should this be
understood as ‘God created everything (mentioned or imported in the Bible)’ or rather as
‘God created everything (including things existing in the actual world)’? I think the better
interpretation is the latter, as someone accepting that ‘God created everything’ is true in
the Bible would say that ‘God created Argentina’ is true in the Bible too.
Thus even if Wildman and Folde are right that a universal sentence might be true in a
fiction without ranging over a truly universal domain, it does not follow that it is always
the case. The mere surface-grammar parallel between ‘Everyone is dead’ and ‘Everything
is true’ is not enough to say that they are parallel cases. Pending further argument, the
intended range of the quantifier in fRDK ’s is the prima facie unrestricted range, that which
the authors intended too.
4 Explosive stories
Based on their suspicions about fRDK ’s but believing in the possibility of universal fictions,
Wildman and Folde propose a distinct general recipe to generating them: craft a fiction f
that includes, either as primary or secondary content, both the principle of explosion
EQC If A and ¬A then B
and a contradiction. Assume a schema of local fictional modus ponens (LFMP)
LFMP If Tf [A ⊃ B] and Tf [A] then Tf [B]
holds (remember the notation introduced in Section 2). Taken together, these would guar-
antee that every possible proposition is part of f ’s secondary content. Consequently, f
would be at least a secondary-universal fiction.
Or so Wildman and Folde say. I will argue here that their stories are not more truly
universal than the fRDK ’s, and in the worst case, they might not be truly universal,
depending on how much weight one puts on imaginative resistance as an effective pointer
of fictional content. In any case, their stories are more logically loaded, they need more
principles, and in the end their universality will depend on the ultimate viability of the
fRDK ’s, as the schemas are masking the use of universal instantiation, which is all what
fRDK ’s need.
Here is one of their three purported universal stories:
Monsieur Impossible
In the Kingdom of Classicalia, where Classical Logic holds, the most famous
and wondrous of the King’s Musketeers is Monsieur Impossible. (Of course, if
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one is a member of the King’s Musketeers, then one is employed by the King!)
Rumored to be from the far-away land of Australia, Monsieur Impossible is the
very epitome of the Musketeer ideal. But what is so impressive about him is
that he has exactly two hands and does not have exactly two hands. And this
incredible power - to have and not have exactly two hands - makes him the
mostly deadly swordfighter around, the elite amongst the elite! Of course, it
also makes him the worst swordfighter around, as well as the best (and worst!)
card player....
The first objection comes from what can be called, following Kapsner, logical imaginative
resistance. A case of logical imaginative resistance occurs when it is hard to accept even
the fictional truth (validity) of conclusions (inferences) not warranted by the fiction, very
much like imaginative resistance on moral and humorous issues. That would be why, even
if, say, Sylvan’s Box is contradictory, one does not come to think that everything is true
in it. The same would happen with Monsieur Impossible: perhaps the most famous and
wondrous of the King’s Musketeers in Classicalia satisfies some contradictory properties
and thus makes true some contradictory sentences, but the fiction seems definitely silent
regarding the truth of ‘Richard is a cannibal’ and infinitely many other sentences.
But that could be a not so telling objection for Wildman and Folde’s proposal. They
could perfectly reply that there is a significant difference between Sylvan’s Box, or some
other contradictory stories, and the fiction just portrayed, namely that ECQ holds in the
primary content of the latter, whereas it is not even imported in the case of the former.
But logical imaginative resistance should not be so easily dismissed. Even supposing that
ECQ were to be included in the primary content of Sylvan’s Box, I think the reader will
resist the claim that everything is to be inferred from the earlier contradictions. And any
usual attempt to motivate ECQ further will fail, because it will need to invoke the principle
that a contradiction is never true, which is clearly violated in any contradictory story from
the outset.
Another objection is that the prerequisites for Monsieur Impossible to be a universal
story seem impossible to meet. Wildman and Folde (2017: 74) rightly remind us that “there
is significant debate about whether authorial intentions suffice to make something true in a
fiction”. Thus, in fact it can be that, in spite of their intentions, the things needed to make
this story universal cannot be jointly true. The allegedly classical world, the Kingdom of
Classicalia, is actually very strange, and it is not clear at all that classical logic actually
holds at it. How can it be that in a classical world a contradiction is true in the first place?
Someone could say that classical logic per se does not preclude the truth of contradictions
but it merely makes them explosive, that is, ECQ is logically valid (in classical logic).
Let us put aside the facts that there is no semantics that characterize classical logic and
makes a contradiction, a formula of the form A ∧ ¬A, designated under some valuation
and that classical logic comes not only with a set of valid arguments, but also with a set
of invalid arguments. If ECQ is going to be logically valid -in a truth-preserving sense-,
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it never happens that contradictions are true and what follows from them is false. This
can be achieved in a number of ways: either all what follows from a contradiction should
be already true in order to avoid true premises and false conclusions, which amounts to
having trivialism before ECQ; or there is always a match between true contradictions and
true consequences of them, such that it never happens that a true contradiction implies a
false conclusion; or else contradictions are never true. To be honest, only the latter option
sounds like classical logic.
Therefore, either the Kingdom of Classicalia is indeed classical and no actual contra-
diction can happen there, and thus cannot be trivial, or it is already trivial in order to
have contradictions in them and nonetheless validate ECQ (and all the other classically
valid arguments, as well as everything else). In this latter case, Wildman and Folde do
effectively beg the question, assuming that every possible proposition is already included
in Monsieur Impossible, ready to be “triggered” by ECQ. As we shall see in more detail
later, this assumption, what they consider a defect in fRDK ’s, haunts their proposal too.
Note that the dilemma above is not a false one. Suggesting that there is the option
that the Kingdom of Classicalia is non-classical (in spite of the name!) but non-trivial does
not work, because either it validates ECQ (like intuitionistic worlds) or they do not (like
some paraconsistent worlds). In the first case, the situation is as much as in the classical
option; in the second one, the failure of ECQ impedes having a trivial world from a true
contradiction.
But Monsieur Impossible uses far more than the required by Wildman and Folde’s
recipe: what the recipe requires is only that ECQ holds, not that the full of classical
logic does. In fact, they provide two additional fictions in which it only is stated that the
principle of explosion holds, not the whole of classical logic:
Ohle’s Amazing Adventure
One day, Ohle the wonder-dog set out on a wander through Explodiberg, a land
governed by the principle of explosion (which, as we all know, states that from
a contradiction, anything follows). On his adventure, Ohle ate exactly three
treats and not exactly three treats (rather, exactly four). Doing so, he brought
about the greatest calamity Explodiberg ever saw, since everything followed in
his wake.
Clara’s Crazy Caper
Exploring the castles, creeks, and crags of the canton of Concorida, where the
principle of explosion – which states that, if p ∧ ¬p, then q (for every q) –
holds, Clara discovered a conclave of carrots. Feeling hungry, Clara consumed
exactly three and not exactly three (but rather four) carrots. (Of course, if one
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has consumed exactly three and not exactly three carrots, then some carrots
have been consumed.) Consequently, filled to the brim on crispy carrots, Clara
cavorted away, creating chaos.
The first thing to note about these new stories is that Wildman and Folde seem to be
using a double standard in judging the fRDK ’s and constructing their own fictions (that
can be collectively called ’fWF ’s’). They also quantify over all propositions, as can be
noted in the two stories above – ‘from a contradiction, anything follows’ and ‘everything
followed in his wake’, in the first story; ‘if p∧¬p, then q (for every q)’ in the second –, but
for some reason they do not find this problematic in their own stories. As I have argued in
the previous section, they are in the right in not doing so, but that also exempts fRDK ’s.
Which of them is a better recipe has to be decided by other means, and I will argue that
unlike fRDK ’s, fWF ’s presuppose the logical machinery of fRDK ’s (universal instantiation)
and uses even more principles, ECQ for example, that are more prone to produce logical
imaginative resistance than those employed in the fRDK ’s.
In these new fictions, there is a contradiction, and since ECQ holds, everything is true
there. The objection to Monsieur Impossible about the impossible classicality seems not
to work for these ones. Nonetheless, the fWF ’s seem universal only diachronically, and
thus not really universal, or in the best case ECQ implies a complete restructuration of the
time of narration. Ask a reader, in a test like the one at the end of Sylvan’s Box, whether
in Ohle’s Amazing Adventure everything was true before Ohle ate exactly three and not
exactly three treats. For example, whether before that Ohle was a bird or identical to
Bob Meyer, or whether the story started in Paris, or whether ECQ was invalid, or whether
validity lead from truth to falsity. Perhaps the first reaction is answering ‘No’ to any of
these questions, by some sort of imaginative resistance, and only after reflection, if at all,
the reader can concede that, because of the explosion, it has to be true that already before
the contradiction happened Ohle was a bird and identical to Meyer, that the story took
place in Paris, that ECQ is valid, that validity leads from truth to falsity, and that the
contradiction never occurred. However, if that is so, it is true that everything was true
before the contradiction happened, and so on. It requires a complete restructuring of the
time of narration, and that could still face imaginative resistance to do this.
Someone could reply that the fWF ’s fictions are universal but the reader discovers
this towards the end of them, which is a standard technique in narrative. My point is
precisely that readers might not take that as a discovery, but as a flaw in the story; they
might resist entertaining the universality of the fiction, against the best intention of the
authors, because they were told that things are such and such, and then, by a puff of
logic, now they have to entertain the idea that everything was always true. This might not
affect the universality of those fictions, but it makes them far less digestible than fRDK ’s
fictions. These do not face similar resistance. Once one has granted that ‘everything’
means everything, no restructuration of the time of narration is needed, and there are no
conflicts between times when only some things were true and others when everything is
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true, including that even in the previous times when not everything was true everything
was true already. If imaginative resistance were a reliable guide to fictional content, that
would compromise the universality of fWF ’s. I do not endorse such a view, but it is worth
having it in mind for comparison.
Their convoluted character can be at least part of what makes the fWF ’s better qua
fictions than the fRDK ’s. However, that is an entirely different matter. What was at
stake was the universality of the fictions, and the fact is that the fRDK’s are more clearly
universal than the fWF ’s. One can even conjecture that, the more narrative the fiction is,
or the more literary value it has, the most subject to criticisms based on logical imaginative
resistance it is. Surely, simplicity is not a virtue in the literary realm, but in this case that
might be exactly what helps the Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner universal fictions to be what
they are intended to be.
To finalize, I would like to recall that ECQ could be more contentious than modus
ponens even in the context of fiction. But ECQ is dispensable for producing Wildman-
Foldesque universal fictions; a subjunctive version of LFMP alone would do as well. Con-
sider the following story:
LoFiMoPo’s Carelessness
everything would be true, so it is. LoFiMoPo, in their eternal ineffable at-
tributes, settled that if they created a grubble, everything would be true, with
circled squares living on top of golden mountains, one plus one being five and
humans being fried eggs. And so there was an unconceivable time in their inef-
fable eternity that LoFiMoPo created a grubble. But if they created a grubble
True, this fiction also quantifies over propositions, like the fWF ’s, and so is dependent on
the viability of fRDK ’s, just like the fWF ’s. However, I think this story is superior to the
usual Wildman-Foldesque universal fictions in two respects: LFMP invites less imaginative
resistance than ECQ in the context of fiction, and the time of narration is such that it is
not necessary to distinguish between a time before triviality and a time where triviality
starts.8
Summarizing: Wildman and Folde’s universal fictions also require quantification of all
propositions in order to be truly universal. In that respect they do not score better than
the fRDK ’s. The logical machinery used by the fWF ’s to produce triviality invites more
imaginative resistance than that of the fRDK ’s – universal instantiation – and, moreover,
they presuppose the latter in order to instantiate from ‘from a contradiction, anything
follows’, ‘everything followed in his wake’ or ‘if p ∧ ¬p, then q (for every q)’.
8In fact, one could distinguish between Liar-like fictions, like Wildman and Folde’s, and more Curry-
like fictions, like LoFiMoPo’s Carelessness. (However, if Abelian logicians are right and a conditional is a
kind of generalized negation – see Meyer and Slaney (1989) –, modus ponens is a general form of ECQ.)
Nonetheless, a more systematic matching between paradoxes and universal fictions goes beyond the scope
of this paper.
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5 Conclusions
I defended here are that there are universal fictions, and that the Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner
way of generating them – namely, with a story including deliberately and explicitly the
proposition Everything is true – is still the best one. I reconstructed Wildman and Folde’s
Finean criticisms to universal fictions a` la Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner based on the idea that
the universal quantifier in such fictions may not target the intended range of quantification,
that is, all propositions. I showed that Wildman and Folde’s argument does not succeed,
for they fail to show that every universal sentence has to be understood as involving a
restricted quantifier.
In addition, I examined Wildman and Folde’s own strategy to generate universal fictions
and presented some objections to it. The outcome was that they do not score better than
the Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner fictions and, in the worst case, they fall short of being truly
universal fictions. Alas, this is not a universal paper: a discussion of consequences of the
possibility and actuality of some universal fictions, as well as their duals, empty fictions, is
left for another occasion.
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